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1. Introduction 
The terms ‘whole brain emulation’, ‘mind uploading’, and ‘substrate 
independent minds’ have been used in recent years to describe the 
hypothetical possibility of transferring or emulating the functioning of 
a human’s brain or ‘mind’ on a synthetic substrate. Philosophers and 
scientists debate both the technical feasibility and philosophical 
plausibility of such transfers. In this paper we take no view on the 
technical debate, except to note that the proposed methods are all 
highly speculative, relying on knowledge and techniques which have 
not been created. 
The philosophical debate has largely been concerned with the 
question of identity: will a person survive the transferral process from 
a biological to a synthetic substrate? The answers to this question have 
settled into well-worn grooves, with participants presuming that there 
is some objective fact of the matter when it comes to the continuation 
of identity and that this can be ascertained through scientific or 
rational enquiry. In this paper, we argue that this understanding of the 
debate is flawed. What many participants miss is that personal identity 
is, in large part, a social construct. Whether the same identity survives 
a process of transfer depends on social factors. There is good reason to 
think that social factors will be more important than neurological or 
metaphysical ones when it comes to the future utilization of per-
sonality transfer technologies. We explain why this is the case, show-
ing how our personal identities are constructed by social factors both 
causally and constitutively (terms which will be explained in Section 
4), and how the choice of technical process for personality transfer 
may influence the continuation of personal identity. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly summarize 
some of the proposed procedures for mind uploading and brain emula-
tion, suggesting that they are best described by the label of ‘personal 
transfer to synthetic human’. In Section 3, we highlight the importance 
of personal identity to the philosophical debates about these pro-
cedures, and introduce our argument about the social construction of 
identity. In Section 4, we clarify what we mean by social construction, 
distinguishing between two distinct forms. In Section 5, we defend the 
claim that personal identity is socially constructed, using an analogy 
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with the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama to make our point. Finally, in 
Section 6, we identify various features of personality transfer pro-
cedures that could make the continuation of identity more socially 
credible. 
2. Proposed Procedures 
for Personality Transfer 
In this section we briefly summarize the main possibilities that have 
been suggested in non-fictional writing that are linked to the concept 
of mind uploading. Some speculate (Moravec, 1988, p. 110; Kurzweil, 
2000, pp. 52–4; Sandberg and Bostrom, 2008; Hayworth, 2010a; 
2012; Koene, 2012a; Deca, 2012) that a human brain could be 
scanned at a high level of detail; that from these data its functioning 
could be derived and simulated by a computer, where the simulation 
may be at a neural level or a more abstract functional level; the 
simulation would then couple with a robotic or virtual body in order to 
reanimate the individual who was scanned (typically the scanning is 
envisaged for the brain of a deceased individual). Some focus (Koene, 
2012b; Martins, Erlhagen and Freitas, 2012) on recording the low-
level functioning of the live brain as a complementary data-gathering 
approach to assist in the parametrization of such simulations. Others 
speculate (Rothblatt, 2007; 2012; Bainbridge, 2009; 2012), that 
information collected about an individual (including but not limited to 
psychological self-analyses) could be used to parametrize a generic 
substrate, i.e. a humanoid robot, in order to reconstruct the individual. 
Yet others speculate that a human’s brain (and body) could be 
gradually replaced by synthetic parts with the end result that the 
individual would continue to live with a synthetic (robotic) substrate 
(Moravec, 1988, pp. 109–10; Kurzweil, 2000, pp. 52–4); or that a 
device worn externally over an extended period could learn to emulate 
a particular person, so as to eventually control a robotic replacement 
for them (Moravec, 1988, p. 110). Wiley (2014) and Bamford (2012) 
have both attempted to taxonomize the different procedures and 
provide some analysis of the differences between them. It should be 
clear from their descriptions that each of these proposed procedures is 
highly speculative, relying on technology and know-how which has 
not been created. 
All of these proposals involve some attempt to copy information 
about a person (the functionality of their brain; their personality traits, 
etc.) and reproduce this information in a synthetic substrate (robot, 
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digital computer, etc.). They vary in terms of the information they try 
to capture and reproduce, and the methodology they use to transfer 
this information from the original, biological person to the synthetic 
analogue. What they all have in common is that before the procedure 
there would be a live human (hereafter ‘biological human’), after the 
procedure there would be some synthetic, cybernetic, or virtual 
human-like entity (hereafter ‘synthetic human’), and there would be 
some reason to claim that the biological human and the synthetic 
human were the same person — the same identity. 
That the continuation of personal identity is key to understanding 
the debate about these proposed procedures is clear from how they are 
described by the many authors who have discussed them. For 
example: 
The debate over mind uploading revolves around a central question, 
‘What do you consider to be you?’ Mind uploading is useless if this 
personal definition of ‘you’ is not successfully transferred. (Hayworth, 
2010a) 
Is there any chance that we — you or I, personally — can fully share in 
the magical world to come? This would call for a process that endows 
an individual with all the advantages of the machines, without loss of 
personal identity. (Moravec, 1988, p. 109) 
The… question… is whether the post-transfer computers will be the 
same persons as those who undertook the transfer. Will the identity of 
the person be maintained? (Phillips, 2000, chapter 5) 
Rothblatt (2012) described an experiment which would allow us to 
decide if ‘…the software-based mind is a technoimmortalized con-
tinuation of the predecessor’s identity’. 
Oto (2012) identifies ‘…a vexing problem of personal identity — 
for we will wish to know if an uploaded copy of our mind amounts to 
a copy of us, or actually is us’. 
Hopkins (2012) wrote: 
The real question in uploading is whether uploading procedures main-
tain the identity of the specific mind throughout the process. 
The common theme in the above quotations is that the preservation of 
personal identity is the important factor. The terms ‘mind uploading’ 
and ‘substrate independent minds’ give the impression that the human 
mind is the target of these transfer procedures. But the term ‘mind’ 
can be ambiguous. In the sense used by the authors above it refers to a 
set of memories and patterns of thinking of an individual human that 
sets them apart from individuals in similar circumstances. Many of 
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these authors adopt a ‘patternist’ view of mind and personal identity 
(Wiley, 2014, chapter 5). They believe that identity is a question of 
preserving informational patterns. For example, Moravec wrote: 
‘Pattern identity… defines the essence of a person, say myself, as the 
pattern and the process going on in my head and body, not the 
machinery supporting that process’ (1988, p. 117) (Goertzel, 2006, p. 
2, traces patternist philosophy back further). Others express similar 
views: 
…mind is in essence about patterns of organization and behavior, and… 
the same patterns of organization and behavior can almost surely be 
realized via multiple different substrates. (Goertzel and Ikle, 2012) 
There is a pattern that is very dear to us. This pattern is the information 
content of our minds. By the information content, I mean both the 
parameter settings (e.g., memory), as well as the ways in which the 
parameters are used, the functions carried out by the mind… That 
pattern is all that we are aware of being. (Koene, 2011) 
…my identity is rather like the pattern that water makes when rushing 
around a rock in a stream. The pattern remains relatively unchanged for 
hours, even years, while the actual material constituting the pattern of 
the water is replaced in milliseconds. (Kurzweil, 2000) 
So, according to these authors, one’s ‘mind’ or ‘identity’ consists in a 
pattern of memories and mental functions that marks one out as a 
unique identity. 
In order to choose an appropriate label under which to group the 
proposed procedures and the hope they represent, we prefer to set 
aside the labels ‘mind uploading’ and ‘substrate independent minds’, 
and also ‘mind substrate transfer’, which we previously endorsed 
(Bamford, 2012), and opt instead for ‘personal transfer to a synthetic 
human (PTSH)’. This is a consequence of taking together the two 
points presented above in this section: (a) personal identity is con-
sidered the important target to be preserved through transfer; and (b) 
where ‘mind’ is considered the important target, there is a concurrent 
belief that ‘mind’ is a pattern which defines personal identity. We also 
favour PTSH over ‘transmigration’ (Moravec, 1988) and ‘techno-
immortalization’ (Rothblatt, 2012) as it is more descriptive. 
3. What is Personal Identity Anyway? 
The debate about whether proposed procedures for PTSH would 
preserve personal identity is a branch of a broader and longer-running 
debate about the nature of the person. There are many competing 
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theories of personal identity, and no apparent consensus. Phillips 
(2000, chapter 5), for example, links the pattern-identity position of 
some of the aforementioned authors to the dominant class of Lockean 
theories of personal identity which include a memory criterion for 
identity (Locke, 1690/1975), and a psychological continuity criterion 
(Parfit, 1984, pp. 205–7). Schneider (2009, p. 7) points out that 
‘Patternism is an updated version of the psychological continuity 
theory’. Other authors have done a thorough job of both describing 
and highlighting alternative personal identity theories such as body 
identity, brain identity, and soul identity, according to which continua-
tion of identity depends on maintaining the same body, brain, or soul. 
Animalist theories are also popular and maintain that the continuation 
of personal identity depends on the persistence of our animalistic 
properties (roughly: our homeostatic biological systems). If they cease 
to exist, we cease to exist (Olson, 2007). Biologically-oriented 
theories of this sort seem strongly opposed to the possibility of PTSH, 
hence why the Lockean, patternist theories are preferred among 
proponents of these technologies (Chalmers, 2014). 
Irrespective of where these theories come down on the possibility of 
PTSH, they all assume that personal identity is constituted and 
sustained by the persistence of functionalist, psychological, biological, 
or supernatural factors (i.e. mental patterns, psychological states, 
biological processes, or a common ‘soul’). There exists, however, an 
alternative view — that personal identity is a social construct. 
Kompridis (2009, p. 27) laid down the gauntlet: 
But what if personal identity is not in the head, not in the brain, and not 
something that can be extracted from the life history of an individual, 
rendered discrete, and subject to manipulable processes as is any mere 
‘object’? What if personal identity is constituted in, and sustained 
through, our relations with others, such that were we to erase our 
relations with our significant others we would also erase the conditions 
of our self-intelligibility? 
In a complementary stance, Hongladarom (2011, p. 541) wrote: 
…personal identity has traditionally been associated with internalism — 
factors thought to be responsible for fixing the identity have come from 
internal sources such as the subject’s own beliefs and memory episodes. 
However, one could follow the lead of the social epistemologists and 
other externalists in epistemology and… argue that external factors are 
really the ones that fix the identity… [O]ne could… try to locate the 
source instead outside of the subject’s cognitive domain. 
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Such ideas are by no means widely accepted; indeed they go against 
commonly held notions that questions of continuity of personal 
identity are too important to be determined arbitrarily or to depend on 
third parties (Parfit, 1984, p. 267). But what we wish to argue in the 
remainder of this paper is that this scepticism is misplaced. Personal 
identity is indeed, in large part, a social construction. Whether we 
continue to exist depends not just on the satisfaction of psychological 
or biological conditions, it depends also on the satisfaction of social 
conditions, particularly conditions relating to networks of interaction 
between a human and their social peers, as well as systems of 
collective belief. What’s more, when it comes to the practical utiliza-
tion and significance of PTSH technologies, these social factors will 
have a far more decisive role to play than biological or psychological 
factors. 
It helps in making this argument to distinguish between two per-
spectives on personal identity: 
 First-person perspective: Do I continue to exist if I undergo a 
PTSH process? In other words, is the ‘me’ that starts the process 
the same as the ‘me’ that results from the process? 
 Third-person perspective: Does Jack (or whoever) continue to 
exist if he undergoes a PTSH process? In other words, should we 
treat the biological Jack at the start of the process as being the 
same as the synthetic Jack at the end of the process? 
The first-person perspective is concerned with the continuation of the 
self as a continuing subject of conscious experience. We are conscious 
and self-conscious beings. We are aware of what happens and we have 
a sense that it is happening to us (i.e. to some single, coherent self). 
We also sense that it is the same self that persists over time in having 
these experiences. When we look at PTSH from the first-person per-
spective what we are wondering is whether this self will survive the 
transferral process. The third-person perspective is different. It is con-
cerned with the continuation of the self as a bundle of social roles, 
rights, duties, and responsibilities. We all stand in relations to one 
another. We are friends, lovers, bosses, enemies, and so forth. We 
have certain legal rights and duties towards others. We also stand in 
legally-recognized relationships to objects and persons in our social 
environments. When we ask the identity question from this per-
spective we are wondering whether we should ascribe the same bundle 
of social roles, rights, responsibilities, and duties to the synthetic 
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human that results from the transferral process. Whether we do, or not, 
obviously has enormous social significance. It will affect how we 
understand and accept putative PTSH technologies. 
At first glance, it might seem like the senses of identity at play in 
both of these perspectives on the question are very different. Further-
more, it might be relatively easy to see how personal identity gets 
socially constructed from the third-person perspective, but less easy to 
see how it gets constructed from the first-person perspective. It is also 
probably fair to say that many of those interested in the debate about 
PTSH are concerned with identity from the first-person perspective. 
Nevertheless, we argue that a large part of personal identity is socially 
constructed no matter which perspective you take. This doesn’t mean 
that biological or psychological factors are irrelevant, but their 
importance is conditioned by the social factors that construct identity.1 
4. Two Varieties of Social Construction 
Before we get into the meat of this argument, we need to clarify what 
is meant by social construction. Hacking (1999, p. 6) suggests that the 
core of any claim to social construction is a contingency claim. If you 
say that X is socially constructed, what you are saying is that X is not 
                                                          
1  The authors of this paper differ, to some extent, in their commitment to the social 
constructionist thesis. Author 1 embraces a stronger version of the thesis in which social 
conditions are all that ultimately matter and that there exists no objective truth about the 
association of personal identities to particular humans but only beliefs about the 
personal identities of humans. Author 2 thinks that social conditions matter quite a lot 
— more than has been fully appreciated in this debate so far — but that the social 
constructionist thesis may still miss something important about personal identity. Con-
sider, for example, the hypothetical perfect hermit, i.e. one that spends their entire life 
isolated from society, and not just one that retreats from society after being raised and 
socialized there. Would they still have an identity? Author 2 believes that such an indi-
vidual would have some identity but that it is likely to be significantly impoverished 
and nothing like the kind of identity in which the proponent of PTSH is interested. 
Author 1 does not see a contradiction with the strong social constructionist thesis. The 
focus on social construction is simply the major implication of a fundamental view 
(discussed in Section 5, below) in which the set of concepts regarding a human which 
constitute the personal identity related to that human resides in the memories of 
humans. Since the set of humans whose memories can contain concepts about a particu-
lar human does not exclude that particular human whom the personal identity is a 
conceptualization of, that human would not lack an identity, but rather it would consist 
in a single conceptualization. In this case, there would be a lack of interactions in which 
the identity could develop, thus an identity which is impoverished in some ways with 
respect to the norm seems a likely result. 
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‘determined by the nature of things’ but rather by social factors. Diaz-
Leon refines this to the claim that: 
 Social Construction: If X is socially constructed, this means that 
the ‘instantiation and distribution of X is contingent upon certain 
social events and arrangements: if those social events and 
arrangements were different, then facts about X could be differ-
ent’ (Diaz-Leon, 2013, pp. 2–3). 
So when we claim that personal identity is socially constructed, what 
we are claiming is that the fact that any human body is associated with 
a particular identity (whether this is viewed from the first-person or 
third-person perspective) is contingent upon social events and 
arrangements. If those social events and arrangements had been 
different, the identity claim may not hold.2 
We need to be even more precise. Most contemporary accounts of 
social construction distinguish between two types of social con-
struction: the causal and the constitutive (Diaz-Leon, 2013; Haslanger, 
2003; Mallon, 2008). The distinction is captured by the following: 
 Causal Social Constructionism: X (some individual entity) is 
causally socially constructed as Y if and only if social factors 
play a significant role in causing X to have those features by 
which it counts as Y (adapted from Haslanger, 2003, p. 317, and 
Diaz-Leon, 2013, p. 5). 
 Constitutive Social Constructionism: X (some individual 
entity) is constitutively socially constructed as Y if and only if X 
is a kind or sort Y such that in defining what it is to be Y we must 
make reference to social factors or, to put it another way, X is 
constitutively constructed as Y if social factors are meta-
physically/conceptually necessary in our explanation or under-
standing of what it is for X to be Y (adapted from Haslanger, 
2003, p. 318; Mallon, 2008, p. 6, and Diaz-Leon, 2013, p. 5). 
                                                          
2  Hacking (1999, p. 6) suggests that most social constructionist claims bring with them 
the implication that the current instantiation and distribution of X is bad or socially 
problematic, and so ought to be reformed, but these claims are not essential to the social 
constructionist thesis. It is possible to be a social constructionist about X and be 
perfectly happy about the instantiation and distribution of X. That is important to bear in 
mind here. When we claim that personal identity is socially constructed we are not 
making an evaluative claim about the desirability or triviality of this social arrangement. 
All we are saying is that identity is affected by social events and arrangements. 
 10 S.  BAMFORD  &  J.  DANAHER 
These definitions are best understood by way of examples. Any 
human-made artefact would count as causally socially constructed. 
Take a wristwatch (Diaz-Leon, 2013, p. 6). A wristwatch is a particu-
lar individual object and it belongs to the general class of wrist-
watches (devices that tell the time on your wrist). Clearly, the wrist-
watch didn’t come into existence through spontaneous creation or a 
sequence of natural, non-human events. It was designed and fashioned 
by human beings, operating in particular social circumstances, at 
particular historical moments. It is, thus, causally socially constructed. 
Social factors have played a significant role in causing the wristwatch 
to have the features by which it counts as a wristwatch. But once the 
wristwatch has come into existence, it has some metaphysical 
independence from the social factors that were essential for its 
creation. The society that created it could crumble and fall and it 
would still exist as a wristwatch. 
Contrast that with a case of constitutive construction. Social roles 
are the classic example. Take the status of being Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom as an example. This status is determined entirely by 
social factors and events. It requires compliance with some formally 
agreed upon procedure (nomination, voting, election) and collective 
belief in and acceptance of the validity of that procedure. These 
factors constitute what it means to be Prime Minister. Without these 
social factors, a particular individual cannot be Prime Minister. These 
social factors sustain this status on an ongoing basis. If there is a 
political revolution or a change in the agreed upon procedure or 
process, the individual who used to be called Prime Minister will lose 
this status. This makes it quite unlike the case of the wristwatch. 
Being Prime Minister does not have conceptual or metaphysical 
independence from social factors. Those social factors are con-
ceptually and metaphysically necessary if some individual is to count 
as Prime Minister. 
These distinctions mean that there are three ways to interpret our 
claim that personal identity is socially constructed. It might mean: (a) 
that we think that in order for some human body to count as having a 
particular identity, certain social factors had to cause it to have the 
properties that we associate with that identity; or (b) it might mean 
that we think certain social factors actually constitute (sustain) the 
properties that enable it to count as having a continued identity; or (c) 
it might mean that we think identity claims involve both causal and 
constitutive construction. Our view is the latter. We think that in order 
for any individual body to count as having a continuing identity it 
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must be caused to have certain properties by social factors and must 
be sustained in having other properties by social factors. Roughly 
speaking, then, personal identity from a first-person perspective is 
primarily causally socially constructed (though not entirely, as we 
shall see), whereas personal identity from a third-person perspective is 
primarily constitutively socially constructed (where collective belief is 
the main social factor at play). 
It is important to note that our position is not intended to be ethical 
or political in nature. As Hacking notes (1999, p. 6), claims to the 
effect that ‘X is socially constructed’ are often politically and ethically 
loaded. The person who makes that claim is usually appealing to some 
social injustice and asking for our practices of social construction to 
be reformed. We avoid all such ethical appeals here. We are arguing 
that identity is, in large part, socially constructed: we are not arguing 
that this is a good or bad thing. We do try to identify factors that are 
likely to contribute to the success or failure of an identity claim in the 
case of PTSH (Section 6, below), and we stand by our arguments in 
relation to those factors, but again our aim in doing this is not to 
defend the ethical propriety of those factors; it is to suggest that they 
are likely to work. 
Our attempt at ethical neutrality is also complicated by the fact that 
identity claims are particularly politically loaded, with claims of the 
sort ‘I am a man/woman/transgender, etc.’ being among the most 
politically charged one can make. Part of the contention seems to be 
that Western societies are shifting toward a new norm whereby indi-
vidual claims to identity are treated as being sacrosanct: if you say that 
you are X (man/woman, etc.), the society around you should respect 
that claim. This might be thought to create problems for our argument 
in so far as we suggest that identity claims are dependent on third-
party/social factors.3 But, again, we are not saying that this is a good 
thing, merely that it is a thing. And we would argue that whether or 
not we do successfully shift to a norm whereby identity claims are 
treated as sacrosanct is ultimately going to depend on the kinds of 
social factors we discuss below. So the shift to this norm would prove 
the very point we are trying to make. 
There is a danger that our argument is perceived to be quite trivial. 
After all, in some sense it is trivially true that social factors are 
causally responsible for our identities: we would not be who we claim 
                                                          
3  We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point with us. 
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to be were we not caused to have certain psychological features by the 
societies in which we live. Likewise, it seems to be trivially true that 
social factors constitute our identities: the social roles, relationships, 
rights, and duties we have are sustained by various networks of 
collective belief. If you are a married property-owner — if those 
qualities are central to your identity — then you only have them to the 
extent that there is collective belief in certain legal rules and 
principles. If that collective belief is eroded, you would no longer 
have those qualities. What we want to argue next, however, is that 
there is nothing trivial about the type of social construction going on 
in both instances. They are, rather, core aspects of what it means for 
personal identity to persist over time. 
5. How Personal Identity 
Gets Socially Constructed 
The case of the Dalai Lama provides a useful analogy for our 
purposes. There is a belief in reincarnation in Buddhist culture. At its 
heart, this belief maintains that the same identity can be shared across 
different physical biological bodies. The most socially and politically 
significant instance of reincarnation comes in the shape of the Dalai 
Lama, the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan people. The 
current Dalai Lama is the fourteenth in the line of succession. He was 
born Lhama Thondup on the 6 July 1935. Two years later he was 
recognized as the reincarnation of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and two 
years later again he was officially declared to be the fourteenth Dalai 
Lama. 
Under Tibetan tradition, the Dalai Lama is a tulku, i.e. a human 
body that keeps or sustains a certain lineage-identity.4 In the case of 
the Dalai Lama, all human bodies who are recognized as such are 
deemed to be incarnations of the Bodhissatva of Compassion. 
Officially, the line of Dalai Lama tulkus can be traced back to the 
fifteenth-century monk Gedun Drub, who was the first of the modern 
Dalai Lamas; unofficially the lineage is held to stretch back much 
further. According to the tradition, the current tulku can voluntarily 
choose whether he wishes to be reincarnated. Once his physical body 
                                                          
4  All information here is taken from the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s official pronouncement 
on the nature of reincarnation, first published in 2011, and available online at 
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/statement-of-his-holiness-the-fourteenth-dalai-
lama-tenzin-gyatso-on-the-issue-of-his-reincarnation. 
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dies, the search for the new tulku (his reincarnation) begins. Various 
procedures for identifying and recognizing a new tulku are approved. 
To quote from the current Dalai Lama’s pronouncement on the topic: 
After the system of recognizing Tulkus came into being, various pro-
cedures for going about it began to develop and grow. Among these 
some of the most important involve the predecessor’s predictive letter 
and other instructions and indications that might occur; the reincarna-
tion’s reliably recounting his previous life and speaking about it; 
identifying possessions belonging to the predecessor and recognizing 
people who had been close to him. Apart from these, additional methods 
include asking reliable spiritual masters for their divination as well as 
seeking the predictions of mundane oracles, who appear through 
mediums in trance, and observing the visions that manifest in sacred 
lakes of protectors like Lhamoi Latso, a sacred lake south of Lhasa. 
 When there happens to be more than one prospective candidate for 
recognition as a Tulku, and it becomes difficult to decide, there is a 
practice of making the final decision by divination employing the 
dough-ball method (zen tak) before a sacred image while calling upon 
the power of truth. 
When a new tulku is recognized, they are taken in by disciples of their 
predecessor and trained to keep up certain traditions and teachings. In 
this way their identity as the tulku is reinforced and sustained. 
To those who do not share the system of religious beliefs, this can 
look like a bizarre practice. And to be absolutely clear, we do not 
discuss it in order to convince the reader of the Buddhist conception of 
mind, body, and reincarnation. We discuss it because it provides a 
case study of a human society in which there is widespread belief in 
the possibility of personality transfer, and because it illustrates how 
important processes of social construction are to the transference of 
personal identity. The current Dalai Lama believes himself to share an 
identity with an historical lineage due to social events and practices 
that have caused him to have certain beliefs and memories, to accept 
certain truths about his personal narrative, and to think about his 
relationship to the world in a particular way. From a first-person 
perspective, his identity (the continuing subject that he experiences 
himself to be) is causally socially constructed. If he did not grow up in 
Tibetan society, with the set of religious beliefs that it has, and if he 
was not taken in by the disciples of the thirteenth Dalai Lama at an 
early age and taught the beliefs and traditions of the tulku, he would 
not have the first-personal identity that he purports to have. Further-
more, from a third-person perspective, his social role, spiritual rights 
and responsibilities, is constituted by a network of collective beliefs. 
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The society around him believes that he shares a certain identity with 
the Bodhisattva of Compassion and so that is the identity that he is 
constructed as having within Tibetan society. This identity does not 
float free of all biological or psychological conditions of identity. The 
factors that are used to identify the next tulku make this much clear 
since they appeal to some such conditions. But the social factors are 
what ultimately prove decisive. They causally create and constitu-
tively sustain the identity in that society. 
PTSH will rely upon a very different metaphysical understanding 
and technical process of personality transfer, of course. But our argu-
ment is that social construction will be just as important to all 
instances of PTSH as it is to Buddhist reincarnation. We can see this 
by further spelling out the analogy between the two cases. Before any 
PTSH procedure there would be a biological human, after the pro-
cedure there would be a synthetic human, and there would be some 
attempt to claim that the biological human and the synthetic human 
shared the same personal identity. By analogy, then, the dead monk in 
the case of the Dalai Lama is like the biological human in a case of 
PTSH and the child is like the synthetic human. The reasons to claim 
that the previous Dalai Lama and the chosen child share a common 
identity look spurious at first, at least from the point of view of out-
siders to this culture such as the authors. However, retrospectively, a 
compliant child will learn to behave in a manner consistent with 
expectations based on memories of the deceased monk’s personality, 
providing a posteriori justification. Interestingly, just as in the case of 
a synthetic human, he would receive memories from the biological 
human though not through having actually lived those experiences in 
the synthetic body. The child will have some episodic memories from 
the life of the deceased monk that will have been passed to the child 
through word of mouth and thereafter internalized. 
Why does personal identity function like this? We now describe the 
mechanisms that we believe are at work. The social construction of 
identity from the third-person perspective is easiest to explain. It is 
quite clear that certain properties of identity are constitutively con-
structed. The example of the Prime Minister’s social identity is an 
obvious example of this. But what happens in this case happens to all 
of us, all the time. Certain features of our identity — our recognized 
relationships with others, our jobs, our wealth, our qualifications, and 
so on — are dependent upon collective belief. That collective belief is 
influenced by a variety of factors. For instance, recognizing that some-
one has a particular qualification is likely to be influenced by whether 
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or not they have a set of skills, but ultimately it is the collective belief 
that matters. 
The social construction of identity from a first-person perspective is 
harder to explain. We argue that that it results from a combination of 
how our brains work and how cognition gets distributed between our 
brains and the environments in which we live. In other words, we 
argue that the socially constructed nature of our first-personal 
identities is a function of the embodied and distributed nature of 
cognition (Kirsh, 2006; Clark, 2008; Menary, 2007). A human’s per-
ceptual and cognitive abilities develop through life, and each human 
continually updates a highly compressed representation of their sub-
jective history, i.e. their memories. The approximate nature of this 
memory compression is that raw sensations are grouped together to 
form perceptions, which are in turn grouped to form concepts, and so 
on hierarchically; concepts are the units which are linked together in 
memory (and which can be unpacked into perceptions and sensations 
if necessary to probe their meaning). The perceptions that humans 
have, that relate to their own body, form a conceptual grouping which 
we label ‘self’. The human also interacts and communicates 
extensively with other humans and thereby forms concepts of those 
other humans. A ‘person’ is the conceptualization of a particular 
human, whether ‘self’ or ‘other’. By extension, a personal identity 
consists in the set of concepts that relate to a particular person; 
importantly, this set of concepts resides not in one place but in the 
memories of both the human that the person is a conceptualization of, 
and of all their peers. This set of humans each have their own 
memories which relate to the person, and this entire body of informa-
tion forms part of the personal identity. 
Furthermore, some of the cognitive capacities and memories which 
constitute a personal identity are not purely held in the brain of the 
human to which it relates. We rely on networks of (socially con-
structed) cognitive artefacts to sustain our abilities to think and 
remember (Norman, 1991; Heersmink, 2013). These networks of cog-
nitive artefacts include other people. For instance, a person may forget 
something that they had done or experienced, but then be reminded of 
it by one of their peers. The memory of the act was at one point 
present in the brains of both humans, then disappeared from the brain 
of the actor, but persisted in the brain of the peer, to be copied again to 
the brain of the actor at a later point (typically through verbal 
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transmission). Likewise memories can be temporarily offloaded into 
external media, e.g. photos. More generally, bodily form5 and the 
environment can act as substrates for information relevant to personal 
identity. Thus we can think of a personal identity as a continually 
evolving set of information, which is stored disjointly across a set of 
different substrates, typically with the human body in question as the 
hub. In an extreme case of retrograde amnesia, all of the memories 
stored in the brain of the victim become inaccessible, yet the personal 
identity often remains linked to that human through the support of 
peers, who, with extensive effort, can help the victim to reassume their 
identity (Scott Bolzan is one such case in point — Bolzan, Bolzan and 
Rother, 2011). If, however, peers are not available, then the link 
between the human and their prior personal identity is broken and a 
new personal identity must be forged (Benjaman Kyle is a case in 
point — Wikstrom, 2011).6 In addition to this, false memories can be 
as relevant to personal identity as true ones. If a person is falsely con-
victed of a crime, it affects how they are perceived and treated by their 
peers and this inevitably affects their own subsequent behaviour and 
self-image. A related point is that personal identities can be dis-
junctive, with contradictory memories about the person held simulta-
neously by different peers. 
On top of this, personal identities can evolve in the absence of the 
human on which they are based. When a human dies, the personal 
identity suffers loss of the self-concept and related memories held by 
the human themself, but otherwise persists in all the memories that 
were external to the human. This personal identity can continue to 
evolve for a while, even in the absence of the cognitive processes of 
the human because, when peers communicate to each other about the 
person, the total body of information is modified. This process is 
obvious, for example, in the vilification of Jimmy Savile by the 
British public since his death (BBC, 2013). At the other extreme, 
when a pregnancy occurs, the parents-to-be go through preparations 
prior to the arrival of the baby. These may involve naming the child, 
                                                          
5  An example of bodily form could be a scar, which, when seen by the individual, brings 
to their mind the incident that caused the scar. 
6  Wiley (2014, chapter 5) contains an extended discussion of the metaphysics of mind in 
the context of PTSH. His theory gives primary importance to the brain as the substrate 
that constitutes the mind, but his theory allows for the possibility of two physical 
humans constituted one mind, and highlights how brain states and external states 
combine to constitute mind states. 
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creating clothes and space for them, and informing an extended circle 
of peers. In so doing, a personal identity is created even before the 
baby has any real world experience or self-knowledge. If a mis-
carriage occurs then the parents can suffer grief; in this case there is a 
real sense in which a person has died, although there is only a tenuous 
connection between the person (a mental construct in the minds of the 
parents) and the physical fetus. 
This social construction of identity can have odd repercussions. 
There is a standard assumption that a single personal identity relates to 
a single human body. However, this assumption breaks down in some 
unusual cases. We have already discussed the case of the Dalai Lama. 
We briefly describe two others here, starting with conjoined twins. 
Abigail and Brittany Hensel are perhaps a paradigm case (Pihlaja, 
2008); they have two heads but one torso and one pair of arms and 
legs, and so their overall form is similar to that of a single human. 
They share some but not all internal organs and their nervous systems 
join from the lower spine downwards. They show some signs of acting 
as a single person; for example they can cooperate to perform com-
plex real-time control tasks like playing basketball and driving a car 
with apparent ease, often with no need for verbal communication. 
They also sometimes write emails in the first person, as if they were a 
single person, when they both agree on what to say. In most other 
respects though they have different personality traits. Since there 
would be some grounds to consider them as a single person (single 
body; coordinated behaviour; sometimes speaking as one), a decision 
has been made (perhaps implicitly) by them and their peers to the 
contrary. 
Another unusual case is that of dissociative identity disorder (DID). 
As an example, Kim Noble (Weitz, 2006; Mitchison, 2011) had DID 
from an early age, but it went undiagnosed or misdiagnosed for an 
extended period; in this time, peers observed that she had delusions, 
memory problems, erratic behaviour, etc. Once she was diagnosed 
with DID, this was a perspective from which her actions made more 
sense; there are several identities, seemingly with very clear separa-
tion of memories, time-sharing a single body, with abrupt changes 
from one identity to another. Interestingly, it was the act of psychol-
ogists in diagnosing her that allowed a redrawing of the boundaries 
leading to recognition of the multiple personal identities for which the 
body of Kim Noble is the substrate. None of Kim’s personal identities 
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made this leap of understanding on their own, and some continue to 
deny it.7 
Normally the association of a personal identity to a particular body 
is an automatic mental process, but both of the above cases help to 
illustrate that these associations result from decisions made with the 
help of social peers. 
Based on these considerations, we conclude that significant 
elements of personal identity are socially constructed, both in the 
causal and constitutive senses of construction. This is not to say that 
identity does not depend on psychological or other conditions, but the 
importance of these conditions is often filtered through the social 
ones. Consequently, whether the synthetic human that results from a 
transferral process ultimately believes themselves to share an identity 
with a biological human, and is taken by society to share that identity, 
will depend on whether they are socially constructed as having that 
identity. This is what ultimately matters because, as long as people are 
willing to undergo PTSH in the hopes of survival — and we have 
every reason to expect that people will take bets on scientifically 
fanciful processes in the hopes of overcoming death8 — there will be 
synthetic humans. The identities that those synthetic humans have will 
then depend on social factors. 
6. Improving the Credibility of PTSH 
The view of personal identity as a social construct has practical 
implications for approaches to PTSH. We close by reviewing these 
implications. First, there are no absolute criteria for what would con-
stitute a successful transfer; rather, success would be judged by the 
maintenance of distributed cognitive frameworks and the willingness 
of peers to believe that transfer had occurred. Many factors could 
influence this willingness. Those who would like some form of PTSH 
to become a reality therefore have two paths open to them: they could 
work to solve some of the myriad technical problems that would need 
to be solved, for example with constructing suitable synthetic sub-
strates; alternatively they could engage in promotion of the idea of 
PTSH with a view to increasing public acceptance. Concentrating on 
the former, there is a question of which approach to work towards. 
                                                          
7  Some argue that DID is iatrogenic rather than naturally occurring. We take no view on 
the matter here. 
8  People choosing to enter cryonic storage upon death is a case in point. 
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Bamford (2012, Section 7) gave a preliminary discussion of some pros 
and cons of the various approaches. One might choose based on 
estimated technical feasibility, but it’s fair to say that all of the pro-
posed procedures summarized above are currently far beyond our 
expertise and there are many unsolved problems which may ultimately 
prevent any or all of these approaches from coming to fruition. The 
view we have presented suggests an alternative way to decide which 
procedures to work towards based on which are more likely to 
engender belief that transfer would occur; in other words, which 
factors would make PTSH more socially acceptable. In this section we 
discuss the factors we consider important. 
6.1. Quantity and Quality of Information Transferred 
Information relevant to the person which is held in the biological 
human must be moved to a synthetic human. It’s trivially true that the 
more information transferred, the more credible the synthetic human 
would be as the new substrate for the personal identity, since loss of 
information would create results such as memory loss, cognitive 
differences, or, depending on details of the approach, general func-
tional failure. Capturing this information is the technical aspect which 
has received the most attention from proponents of PTSH up to now. 
Hayworth (2012, p. 7), for example, posits that ‘…a particular human 
being’s unique “software” consists of a discrete set of production 
rules, declarative memory chunks, and perceptual and motor 
memories…’, and looks to the detailed structure of the brain’s neural 
network as the carrier of this information. Rothblatt (2007; 2012) and 
Bainbridge (2009; 2012) instead focus on aspects of the behaviour of 
a person, such as the way they answer psychological quizzes, as a 
carrier of information with which a new substrate could be para-
metrized. These approaches would yield greatly differing types of 
information. The former would enable bottom-up reconstruction, 
starting from simple elements of a nervous system and building 
towards a functioning synthetic human. The latter would facilitate top-
down reconstruction, starting from behaviours of a biological human 
and imposing these on a generic substrate. It remains to be seen which 
might be more useful in engendering credibility. 
6.2. Similarity of Form and Function between Substrates 
Some authors, e.g. Moravec (1988), point out that the robots of the 
future would not be constrained to resemble humans or any biological 
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life form. However, it would be easier to believe that a personal 
identity had been transferred if the synthetic substrate had the same 
form, physical capacities, and even distinguishing features as the 
biological human it were replacing. The work of Ishiguro in making 
robotic duplicates of particular people (Miyake et al., 2011) is relevant 
in this respect. Likewise for function, if a synthetic substrate were 
capable e.g. of performing perception through standard human 
modalities, performing human-like cognition, understanding social 
contexts, and producing emotionally appropriate behaviour, such 
abilities would help to give a baseline of human-like behaviour over 
which the unique characteristics related to a personal identity could be 
imposed. Clearly, if a synthetic substrate were virtual in nature, as in 
the visions of some proponents of PST, this would be a fundamental 
change in form which would affect every aspect of the person’s life, 
including the ways in which they could interact with peers. 
6.3. Temporal Continuity of the Person 
Some approaches to PTSH involve cryonic suspension, plastination, 
or some other long-term storage of information relevant to a deceased 
person, with the intention that the person could be reconstructed at 
some unspecified point in the future. Following our assertions above, 
their personal identity continues to evolve in the period in which they 
cease to act in society; they become known as deceased (heretofore 
understood to be an irreversible change); and their relationships with 
friends, family, coworkers, clients, etc. break down, for obvious 
reasons. Society continues to evolve separately from them, leading to 
a gradual loss of the context in which their life was rooted. If informa-
tion stored from the biological human were then reanimated in a new 
synthetic substrate, the reintegration with those parts of the personal 
identity held in the memory of peers would be more difficult the more 
time had passed because the information would be more disjunctive. If 
a procedure provided either immediate or gradual transition of 
information between substrates, then the loss of credibility and other 
problems of integration that might be caused by a defunct period 
could be avoided. Hayworth (2010a) labelled as bad philosophy the 
idea that brain death would lead to the death of the person even if it 
could subsequently be reversed. We don’t disagree with this labelling 
as bad philosophy but we would argue that if the idea were widely 
held in society it would be self-fulfilling and thus could not be so 
easily dismissed. 
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6.4. Spatial Continuity of the Body 
Although the body-identity view of personal identity is philo-
sophically problematic, it accords to a generally held intuitive view 
that a personal identity relates to a specific body. If the transition from 
biological to synthetic human were achieved by the deactivation, 
destruction, or otherwise the death of one, and the separate con-
struction of the other, then we could say that the body which acted as 
the substrate underwent a spatial discontinuity. If instead the transition 
were achieved by a gradual process of replacement of body parts 
(including nervous system parts) with synthetic substitutes, then 
incredulity coming from intuitions about bodily continuity could be 
lessened. 
6.5. Abruptness of Changes 
This partly overlaps with considerations of spatial continuity and of 
similarity of form and function. Humans change physically through 
time and their related personal identities also evolve. If you fell out of 
touch with a friend and then met them again after 10 years, it should 
be no surprise that they looked different, had changed interests and 
attitudes, and had lost some memories of your previous interactions. 
If, however, the same changes occurred to them from one day to the 
next, it would seem pathological, and may even draw their identity 
into doubt. Part of the promise of passing to a synthetic substrate 
would be the possibilities of change that might be offered by the new 
substrate (as in e.g. the visions of Moravec, 1988). Allowing some 
change to occur as part of a PTSH procedure may also ease the tech-
nical constraints of the procedure, since it may allow a reduction in 
the quality or quantity of information that must be passed between 
substrates. However, where changes are necessary or desirable, allow-
ing them to occur gradually while the person’s social relationships 
continue to evolve should increase the credibility of continuity of 
personal identity. Goertzel (2012) has tried to formalize the idea of 
smoothness of change as it relates to continuity of personal identity; 
they have placed emphasis on the self-intelligibility of the person, 
whereas we would include criteria based on the observations of peers. 
7. Conclusion 
We have argued that ‘personal transfer to a synthetic human (PTSH)’ 
is an appropriate collective label for the set of hypothetical procedures 
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which currently go under the labels ‘mind uploading’, ‘substrate 
independent minds’, and ‘whole brain emulation’. This is based on a 
recognition that personal identity is the target for transfer which is 
desired by proponents of these ideas, and that where ‘mind’ is con-
sidered a target for transfer it is conflated with personal identity. We 
have argued for a definition of personal identity as a social construct. 
Specifically, we define a ‘person’ as a concept that a human forms 
regarding either itself (first-person perspective) or another human 
(third-person perspective), which is linked to memories of that 
particular human, and by extension as the set of all such concepts held 
about a particular human by the human themself and by all their peers, 
together with the memories which relate to that human. We have 
explored some consequences of this definition: personal identity 
consists partly of information which is not stored in the brain of the 
human but in the brains of other humans and in the wider environment 
(including the body); false memories can be as relevant to personal 
identity as true ones and personal identities can consist of contra-
dictory information; personal identity can evolve in the absence of the 
human; although human bodies and personal identities normally have 
a one-to-one correspondence, one-to-many and many-to-one corres-
pondences also exist. We have argued that the tradition of reincarna-
tion practised by Tibetan Buddhists is an example of personal identity 
transfer between biological humans, which has been made to work by 
belief without relying on any technological interventions. This 
example suggests that PTSH could be possible but its success would 
be ultimately determined by social factors. Finally, we have discussed 
which features of proposed procedures for PTSH are likely to influ-
ence their credibility. These are: quantity and quality of information 
transferred; similarity of form and function between substrates; 
temporal continuity of the person; spatial continuity of the body; and 
smoothness of changes. 
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